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In contemporary scholarship in the social sciences and humanities, as in our lives when we are 
scared, we are often too quick to divide actions into compliance with or resistance to power. As 
Sedgwick (2003) has observed, there is a paranoid tendency in critical scholarship. But, in fact, 
the world is more subtle and compromised than such an account would suggest. There is 
something heroic and clear-cut about the way this divide between compliance and resistance 
operates, as what it implies is that when compliance ends the result must be resistance, freedom, 
agency. Yet this image is an unkind one: it is haughty about those still caught in the web – and 
manically, cruelly optimistic about everything else. And on which side do we who entertain it 
imagine ourselves to be? An alternative, more modest yet hopefully deeper perspective would be 
one which can encompass the unsteady, roiling encounter of subject and world, with its richness 
of strategies and possible resources out of which some freedom can be built, under conditions not 
of our own choosing, and in various forms of participation. When the binary between compliance 
and resistance fragments, specific and concrete strategies come into view, with their possibilities 
and limitations. 
 
This is not a new point. Others have likewise mined this space below the reified 
resistance/compliance binary, and indeed there has been growing interest in doing so among 
scholars drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (e.g. Holford et al, 2013), among those associated with 
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the ‘reparative turn’ initiated by Sedgwick (see, for example, the April 2014 special issue of 
Feminist Theory; Berlant, 2011), and in the post-human deconstructions of agency (Haraway, 
1987, Gomart and Hennion, 1999). One strand of analysis, for example, and one with a strong 
history, is work on forms of humour – ranging from wry irony to active ridicule. Humour has 
been conceptualized as a strategy for laminating additional meanings to a situation or puncturing 
its puff, whilst also perhaps defusing possible senses of revolt (Schlegel, 1971; Bakhtin, 1986; 
Goffman, 1986). Some have envisioned humour as perhaps even a creative cultural ‘micro-
production’ in a genre of its own (Willis, 2001; Nissen, 2004). Despite such work, however, the 
resistance/compliance binary continues to obscure the picture presented in the social sciences 
and humanities of the range of practices through which power and subjectivity come to be 
negotiated. As a result, ‘agency’ and ‘freedom’ are left to mean a rather restricted and politically 
problematic image of compulsory choice-making, initiative, endurance, self-regulation, 
‘resilience’, severed from their conditions of possibility. In particular, the assumption that 
agency and freedom are active, and compliance passive, is an afterimage of the 
resistance/compliance binary. This binary has obscured the significance of many important 
practices and strategies – such as patience – which negotiate the available terms of power and the 
formation of human subjectivity.  
 
In attending to one such strategy here, we begin by turning to one of the great works of 
twentieth-century philosophical psychology: Laing and Esterson’s (1970) Sanity, Madness and 
the Family: Families of Schizophrenics. In saying ‘great’, we do not mean to imply the work is 
not flawed. It is very flawed: in its undifferentiated polemics against biomedical epistemology, in 
its weak class and gender politics, in many of its implausible causal inferences, in the way that it 
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so often frames both/and combinations as either/or oppositions in its interpretations. But 
something about the text resists erosion, remaining live into the present: 
 
What is it in a ‘great’ work, let’s say of Plato, Shakespeare, Hugo, Mallarmé, James, 
Joyce, Kafka, Heidegger, Benjamin, Blanchot, Celan, that resists erosion? What is it 
that, far from being exhausted in amnesia, increases its reserve to the very extent to 
which one draws from it, as if expenditure augmented the capital? (Derrida, 1989, p. 
845) 
 
For us, the key to the greatness of Laing and Esterson’s book is that, on reading and re-reading, it 
grows in its capacity for making visible, outside of the compliance/resistance binary, the 
diversity of strategies and possible resources available to subjects in relation to a familial power. 
For all its tone of radical polemic, it is a book that knows a world which is subtle and 
compromised, and which does not settle for any image simpler or safer.  
 
In Sanity, Madness and the Family, Laing and Esterson present their interviews with a group of 
young women and their families. These young women have been diagnosed as suffering from 
schizophrenia. The premise for the book is that some of the symptoms shown by these women 
and understood as part of the disease, in fact have been constituted also or entirely by the 
dynamics of familial power. This question leads them to seek intelligibility, even strategy, in 
actions that would be dismissed as meaningless by both psychiatry and conventional accounts of 
power. One such form of action is what was termed ‘flat affect’ or ‘lack of affect’. This concept 
was used within psychiatric discourse from the 1950s onwards. It refers to an expressionless 
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presentation, in drawing a distinction between schizophrenia and depression (e.g. Arieti, 1955; 
Keefe & Harvey, 2010). Whereas a depressed patient might look sad, ‘flat affect’ is a kind of 
emotional opacity in which affective display, in the face in particular, has little range, intensity 
and mobility – and subjectively, it is not clear to the patient what the feelings they experience 
mean or what bearing they may have for them.  
 
One instance of such flat affect amongst the patients in Laing and Esterson’s study was Maya 
Abbott, who ‘was described uniformly in psychiatric report after report as apathetic, withdrawn, 
lacking in affect’ (1970, p. 36). This was understood as the defining feature of her schizophrenia 
by her doctors. However, Laing and Esterson offer an alternative explanation. They observe that 
‘Mr and Mrs Abbott regarded their daughter’s use of her own “mind” independently of them, as 
synonymous with “illness”, and as a rejection of them’ (1970, p. 34). Under such circumstances, 
they suggest, a certain withdrawal of affective display makes good sense as a reduction in 
emotional availability. Given the socio-historical context, such resistance could be conceived 
primarily as a striving for independence within and from the family. But independence has both 
social and psychological dimensions, and both must be realised for it to be meaningful (Mitchell, 
1974; Butler, 2006). From what we learn of Maya’s life, seeking to achieve such resistance in 
this family would, in all likelihood, not have been effective in any case: breaking ties with family 
does not necessarily reduce the power of their internalized voices, especially where these voices 
are both inconsistent and persecutory. Nor does the case presentation give confidence that many 
financial, social and existential resources were available to Maya for affording independence, 
even at this time of increased welfare provision and access to employment. For Maya Abbott, an 
underperformance and unavailability of affect, keeping investment in the world on reserve, offers 
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a way of carving out some space in which to resource and hear the self, without the threats that 
would come from a more assertive display. 
 
A second case Laing and Esterson describe is that of Lucie Blair, whose ‘affect is flattened’ 
(1970, p. 51). Once again, flat affect is framed by Lucie’s doctors as core to her schizophrenia; 
and once again, Laing and Esterson regard it as also constituted by the possibilities for bearable 
existence made available within the power relations that structure Lucie’s family. Flat affect 
could, under these circumstances, be regarded as the more inhabitable of available forms of 
subjectivity: ‘In so far as she gave up, she was supposed to suffer from “affective 
impoverishment”, and when she did not, she was described as “impulsive”’ (1970, p. 64). In a 
third case, Laing and Esterson document that June Field’s psychiatric notes report ‘affective 
flattening, incongruity of thought and affect, and bizarre delusions’ (1970, p. 144). They perceive 
June’s affective flattening as constituted by the same tributary as for Maya and Lucy; when a 
restrictive family environment interprets self-expression as pathology, then to hold back from 
affective availability to the world becomes a survival strategy. June, they observe, ‘has to keep a 
tight control on herself, however, because if she shouts, screams, cries, swears, eats too little, 
eats too much, eats too fast, or eats too slowly, reads too much, sleeps too much or too little, her 
mother tells her that she is ill’ (1970, p. 158). Aside from explicitly making the point, Laing and 
Esterton often render such ‘holding back’ as a perfectly reasonable course of action with 
ordinary turns of phrase: thus, Claire Church, confronted with one of countless mystifying 
denials on the part of her mother, is said to be ‘at a loss for a reply to this’ (1970, p. 94).  
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Drawing on the cases of Maya, Lucie, June, Claire and others, Laing and Esterson generalize 
that:  
 
Particular symptoms that are usually taken to be primary symptoms of an organic 
schizophrenic process – impoverishment of affect and incongruity of thought and affect – 
are here intelligible as social praxis (1970, p. 106). 
  
This rearticulation of symptoms as intelligible praxis could lead from one dichotomy to the next 
– from ‘normal / schizophrenic’ on to ‘compliant / resistant’ – all the while maintaining an 
underlying ‘rational / irrational’ dichotomy by approaching patients’ utterances and actions in a 
way that polemically assumes intelligibility in order to claim it as a research finding. As Laing 
and Esterton state in the preface to the second edition: 
 
No devices are employed here that do not help us to discover social intelligibility as such 
(1970, p. 13) 
This could appear self-confirming, but it echoes Garfinkel (1984), whom they reference just 
before the cited passage. In his ethnomethodology, taking social intelligibility as an a priori is 
what we all do in everyday interaction, as our moral obligation to recognize each other. This is 
the ‘ethno-method’ which Garfinkel, and then Laing and Esterton, decide to follow. But when 
the taken-for-granted, interactional order breaks down, the game of allocating moral 
accountability begins, and attributing pathology is one move in that game. This is where most 
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readers of Laing and Esterton assume that they attribute moral faults to a medico-political 
culture, pathology to families, and reasonable resistance to patients.  
 
A closer reading yields a more complex picture. The intelligibility Laing and Esterton 
reconstruct in understanding the patients is always derived from attending to the subject’s deeply 
contradictory and volatile family life, permeated with mystifications, and rendered in ways that 
leave many questions open (including numerous hints at the psycho-dynamics they explicitly 
decline to explore). In this perspective, flat affect can be regarded as potentially meaningful and 
tactical response precisely through - rather than despite - being a somewhat indeterminate 
response. In the same manner as humour, for example, the indeterminacy of flat affect may be 
quite a responsive way of operating within indeterminate and contradictory situations. Such an 
interpretation resonates with recent work by Lauren Berlant (2015). Berlant proposes ‘flat affect’ 
as a mode of affective-behavioural performance in the work of a number of contemporary actors 
and genres. Flat affect in a cinematic context, for instance, occurs on the horizon of previous 
conventions for the display of feelings – such as deadpan, as a mode of rhetorical delivery that 
solidified in the late 1920s  – but presents a distinctive formulation. One possibility which our 
genres of interpretation and imagination supply to make sense of this flat affect is that it is the 
consequence of trauma. Berlant accepts that this may also be true, but urges that we do not 
reduce flat affect to trauma. Not least, the human response to trauma can, over time, be 
elaborated as an adaptation to the available world, offering resources for living, not just 
disruption (trauma as a mine for artistic inspiration would be a familiar example). Berlant’s is a 
more sensitive formulation than the blunt opposition between intelligible social praxis and 
individual medical pathology which Laing and Esterson tend to draw. Berlant knows that a 
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behaviour can be both, for instance beginning as one but over time becoming the other as well. 
Berlant’s account of flat affect has resemblances, in this regard, with the work of Emily Martin 
(2007) on mania and depression, where expressive mood fluctuations are acknowledged as 
potentially debilitating but also culturally valued, depending upon circumstance and the degree 
of reflexive enactment and flexibility involved. 
 
For Berlant (2015, p. 199), the underperformance of affect is curious and important because it 
breaks with ‘the presumption that important emotions deserve expression’. This presumption is a 
strange one, perhaps. How can an emotion deserve an expression? What does it say about how 
we tend to imagine human authenticity and being that this strange presumption is part of our 
everyday culture? It suggests, for Berlant, that we generally find ourselves within a familiar 
arrowing series that moves us from what happens, to putting the feelings it generates into 
familiar terms, and then responding in conventional ways (see also Berlant, 2008; Carr, 2011). In 
disrupting this sequence, she suggests that flat affect makes us less or unevenly accessible to the 
environment, and the possibilities it has to hurt or deplete us. In Laing’s (1961) terms, flat affect 
can be described as attenuating our interface with an untenable, crazy-making set of 
circumstances. For Berlant, in disrupting the sequence of familiar and conventional feeling, flat 
affect offers some room for manoeuvre in relation to situational injunctions experienced in 
relation to external or internal figures. For instance, reserve may permit space to apprehend what 
is happening to us in a different way, or dampen the phantasies that would otherwise fuel a 
headlong dive into aspiration and disappointment, or consider how we should compose our 
actions in response to the array of present demands.  
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Viewed through the resistance/compliance binary, the passivity of flat affect might be regarded 
as a mark of its weightlessness and inconsequentiality. Where we feel unsafe, as in the paranoid 
tendency which organizes the resistance/compliance binary, what help can passivity offer? 
However, Berlant makes a crucial point in reply, building on ideas from Sedgwick (2003). She 
emphasizes that there are things one cannot do, feel or experience, unless some minimal gap or 
space is carved out as freedom from the present and the directions in which this present readily 
hurls us (see also Berlant, 2011). Abstracting from the films her article considers, Berlant offers 
the more general argument that flat affect may appeal as a mode of navigating under two 
conditions, each of which is becoming more prevalent in contemporary society. First, it may 
appeal where someone or a set of people experience a crisis in their ability to make effective and 
consistent claims on the world. Berlant identifies that this is a condition which increasingly 
characterizes political citizenship, as a scene which evokes and forbids despair or anger. To this 
we would add that, though it was decades earlier, this ‘double bind’ psychosocial constellation 
equally was an integral part of the operation of the families in Laing and Esterson, where despair 
and anger were evoked by the available models of being a person in the families – and these 
affects are simultaneously forbidden as possible claims on how the families should operate.  
 
Second, Berlant suggests that flat affect may appeal as a response to environments where 
compulsory expressive emotions are depleting. In the families Laing and Esterson describe, the 
families demand affection and docility from their daughters in a way which stabilizes the family 
environment, but also continually saps it. The form and nature of the demand is one which is 
disconfirming and disfiguring. Others may have been able, perhaps, to comply, to find some 
sources of social and psychological integration or balance. But to varying degrees this is not 
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feasible for the young women in the case studies, and it is in this context that flat affect may 
provide a means of holding off unbearable demands. Berlant identifies that flat affect may 
likewise appeal particularly in contemporary society as a form of quietly-hostile negotiation with 
the smiley-faceness of the service economy, with the personal cost of the inner distortions and 
bargains required by this emotional labour. It offers a means for negotiating with, qualifying and 
stamping, the compulsory choice-making, initiative, endurance, self-regulation, ‘resilience’, 
which are demanded by this service economy without making available the conditions that 
would lead to their achievement.  
 
Berlant thus suggests two rising conditions in contemporary society which give appeal to flat 
affect, observing the rise of flat affect as a mode of behavioural comportment across film, music, 
humour and other forms of contemporary culture. To this, we would add that the conditions 
described by Berlant can be noted to have appeared earlier in Laing and Esterson’s families. 
However, thinking about Sanity, Madness and the Family, we would add a third condition which 
calls out flat affect, and which meshes with Berlant’s work on contemporary injunctions for the 
expression of authentic personal emotion. Something common between Maya, Lucie, June and 
other cases where Laing and Esterson describe affective flattening is that the young women 
present a sense of lacking possibilities for expressiveness felt as their own. For instance, it is not 
clear to them, at times in an intense and unpleasant way, who is controlling their voice. Laing 
and Esterson observe that expressiveness, necessarily something emergent within the family 
context, has been made into a fundamentally contested object within these families.  
 
Robbie Duschinsky, Daniel Reisel and Morten Nissen Compromised, Valuable Freedom: Flat 
Affect and Reserve as Psychosocial Strategies 
  
 
 78 
It is tempting to view this observation as a precursor, not just to the struggle to recover a voice of 
one’s own described in the later ‘Recovery’ movement (Topor, 2001), but also to some of the 
ways that voices have been understood as dialogically constituted in the Hearing Voices 
Network (Leudar and Thomas, 2000). Our voice and words are always elaborated out of 
available conventions and affectively invested images; it is out of this elaboration, its stability 
and its promises, that something comes to feel as internally and integrally our own (Laing, 1961; 
see also Erdinast-Vulcan, 2013). Rather than an inner essence to be dis-covered, such 
‘authenticity’ should be regarded as reconquered and re-covered in processes of social re-
cognition (Taylor, 1991) – and the misrecognition which opposes, yet sometimes blends with 
these, is equally social. With the sense of ‘ownness’ both scaffolded and scuppered by the 
dynamics of their families, ringing through the remarks of the young women is thus a tone of 
shame. Shame is the predictable product when the search for personal authenticity that our 
culture twists into demands for the expression of ‘inner’ emotions is combined with a sapping of 
the social, material and existential conditions for effective independence.  
 
Flattened affect, emotional underperformance, can thus be conceptualized as an operation 
performed on the feelings which organize the self-world boundary, negotiating terms under quite 
adverse circumstances with few resources available and under circumstances of precarious or 
crippled social recognition. In Laing’s (1960) language, it can be described as a kind of split 
within the existential-phenomenological frame that organizes a self within and out of a world of 
experience and activity. Flattened affect may particularly appeal as a response to: 
• a crisis in one’s felt ability to make effective and consistent claims on the world; 
• environments where compulsory expressive emotions are depleting; 
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• a sense of dissatisfaction with the possibilities for expressiveness that are felt as one’s 
own. 
For thinking about the nature of this manoeuvre and its use across different circumstances, the 
term flat affect, however, has the disadvantage of its emergence within a discourse of pathology, 
which limits how we may understand its scope. We prefer, instead, the term ‘reserve’ for typical 
forms of this strategy, and conceptualize psychiatrically-diagnosable ‘flat affect’ as the far end of 
a dimension, and as often occurring in the context of trauma.  
 
The term ‘reserve’ can refer to a determinate amount of something unexploited. One may refer to 
something ‘held in reserve’, ‘coal reserves’, ‘wine reserves’. Specifically, it may refer to 
something left unexploited in order that the rest may be. For instance, the USA have the formal 
institution of a ‘Federal reserve’. Capitalism requires the circulation of funds, based on credit. As 
we know all too keenly in the context of the 2008 credit crunch, banks keep only a fraction of the 
deposits of their customers, and speculate with the rest. However, this then makes the banks 
vulnerable to fluctuations in withdrawals by consumers, as well as more major shocks. The 
function of the Federal Reserve is to be available to provide short-term liquidity as needed, and 
dampen the effect of shocks through loans. This allows banks to remain (over)extended, 
powering capitalism on stabilized credit. The idea of reserve can also refer to an exception to a 
contract, ‘reserving the right’ to something. And, elaborating this sense, reserve can indicate an 
exception to the terms of a social contract. One may ‘have reservations’ about a frame for 
making meaning or assigning value. Reserve here indicates the capacity to accept subjection to 
the terms of contract or convention only on the condition that this subjection is not full or total.  
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Across its different senses, the concept of reserve captures the sense of something (whether 
meaning, value, land, capital) held back from the world in order to negotiate the terms and buffer 
the threats posed by its use and subjection. In this way the term ‘reserve’ captures a tectonic line 
of possible negotiation of power and subjectivity within ordinary life, of which flat affect can be 
regarded as a last resort and emergency form. The clinical situation illustrates the point well, as 
reserve is very much at stake. To illustrate the point: as well as sharp contrasts in function, a line 
of continuity can be observed linking the behaviour of the different agents in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family. Whilst also perhaps the product of trauma and pathology, flat affect can be 
regarded as an intelligible psychosocial strategy to negotiate the terms and buffer the threats 
posed by their subjection to familial power, gender power, and psychiatric discourse. Their 
doctors accessed or enacted a professional reserve, which has the function of keeping the 
personal untrammelled by an impersonal tone even during medical interactions that would 
otherwise be intimate or violating. However, this professional reserve also perhaps functioned as 
a defence against the demands and difficulties of empathy with the mind of a patient who is 
suffering, a necessary step for understanding the meaning of behaviour and the world as they 
encounter it (Cassem, 2009). In addition, reserve can in fact be noted in the behaviour of Laing 
and Esterson, in their double capacity as psychiatrists and social scientists treating ‘experience as 
evidence’ (Laing, 1967, p. 16).  
 
However, the case of the doctor demonstrates a fundamental ambiguity in reserve as a strategy 
for negotiating power and subjectivity. Reserve can, on the one hand, mean a  
determinate actuality held back for now from use, like the sportswoman who keeps some will 
and energy back for expending in the sprint to the finish line. This is the sense when we refer to a 
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‘wine reserve’ or ‘coal reserves’ or a ‘federal reserve’. The wine is not out yet, but it exists as a 
determinate amount to be used later. Heidegger (2009, p. 271) offers the technical concept of a 
‘standing reserve’ to refer to such hidden, determinate actualities: a phenomenon such as a wine 
cellar ‘endures as standing reserve and remains constant in the sense of an inventory’. Compared 
to the standing reserve, a contrast can be drawn with reserve as an indeterminate holding, which 
seeks to retain possibility until reality can be adequate. This is the sense when we refer to 
‘having reservations’ about a situation, which can be intelligible even if we do not necessarily 
know exactly what our reservations are yet. We do not have an inventoried wine cellar of our 
objections, though we know that something is down there. Reserve as ‘indeterminate holding’ is 
also the sense when Ruskin writes of the reserve of the great painter, whose valuation of 
completeness and effective composition means that she or he does not sell potentiality short to 
actuality and its demands for compromise.  
 
As we have seen, Berlant suggests that ‘flat affect’ can be regarded as a strategy which makes a 
subject less or unevenly accessible in response to an injurious or depleting environment. 
However, an important distinction lies in whether emotional flattening, or its less extreme and 
more flexible form reserve, occurs on the basis of a standing reserve or an indeterminate holding. 
Both are versions of compromised freedom, which may nonetheless enable an individual to keep 
or gain their footing in the world. Where flat affect or reserve are adopted as a psychosocial 
strategy on the basis of a standing reserve, the subject permits insertion into the expectations and 
demands of the present in a conditional way, on the basis of energy, ideas, capability or other 
potentiality held back to supply additional options. There is fuel left in the tank, money left in the 
bank, of a known identity for remaining in circulation, and for weighing or pushing for other or 
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further developments. Some measure of freedom from the situation is facilitated by this excess. 
However, it is a freedom created from and compromised by not only the conditional acceptance 
of the present but more importantly by the limits of the inventory of available resources, and who 
or what has supplied them to us.  
 
By contrast, where flat affect or reserve is adopted as a psychosocial strategy on the basis of an 
indeterminate holding, the subject has no stockpile of determinate other options. Rather, they 
hold back from full responsive interface with the present on the basis of a disidentification with 
what it offers. This disidentification is fuelled not by a known identity and its resources, but 
precisely by something more or less than that, perhaps felt as dissatisfaction or recklessness or 
hope (see Bloch and Adorno, 1988; Muñoz, 2009). In his Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows (2013), 
the artist John Koenig offers an illustration of such a feeling of indeterminate holding when he 
introduces the term ‘monachopsis’ (from monachus, ‘single, solitary’ + opsis, ‘vision’), and 
defines it as ‘the subtle but persistent feeling of being out of place, as maladapted to your 
surroundings as a seal on a beach – lumbering, clumsy, easily distracted, huddled in the company 
of other misfits, unable to recognize the ambient roar of your intended habitat, in which you’d be 
fluidly, brilliantly, effortlessly at home.’ Where, for instance, there is a significant disparity 
between gender identity and feasible forms of gender expression, monachopsis may be expected, 
and flat affect offer itself as a strategy for negotiating the tightrope that will then need to be 
walked between personal and social requirements.  
 
Reserve as indeterminate holding may open some measure of freedom through experiments in 
disidentification and transitioning. It is an uncomfortable form of freedom, and may turn out to 
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be empty. And it may ‘time out’, as actuality encourages us to cut our losses and work fully 
within the terms made available to us – this is not necessarily a bad outcome if what times out is 
an unhelpfully hazy optimism. Cutting losses may be the condition for seriously and 
pragmatically engaging with what may be made from the present. But, like access to a standing 
reserve, indeterminate holding offers something real and significant in the differentiation it 
enacts within the interface between subject, power and environment. In a way, it might be said 
that indeterminate holding has possibility itself as its standing reserve, in the protective, 
productive differentiation it enacts in restraining the subject from full engagement with the given 
conventions for behaviour, apprehension and feeling, for making meaning and valuing things in 
the world. This is the conclusion arrived at by Derrida (1995, p. 147):  
 
Differentiation is a protection, a strategy of the living. This is not a little calculation, it’s a 
strategy of desire which divides itself in order to keep something in reserve: I remain 
free, I am not just there, you will see that I am also elsewhere, and thus that I have 
resources, I still have a reserve, some life.  
 
Derrida here emphasizes the importance of indeterminate holding as a resource for living. This is 
in line with his presentation of the concept of l’avenir as ‘what is to come’, a future which resists 
domestication with prediction and rational planning (Derrida, 2005). However, in developing 
such a line of thinking, it is important to note that Derrida does not cancel agency through an 
emphasis on possibility and a derogation of actuality. Reserve is a strategy of the living, 
imminent to and alongside our world of pragmatic concerns and compromises, not an elevation 
outside of it. Indeterminate holdings are socially attributed and taken into account within the 
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hurly-burly of everyday social practices, not as a bank reserve, but as an openness to a dialogical 
process that will both realize and revise our hopes and transform us in the process. This is the 
mutuality of recognition which readers may know from the experience of children growing up to 
be part of families, and changing their family in the process. It may also be familiar from the 
experience of hope as something intangible, yet utterly real, negotiated, contested, and alive; we 
may enact reserve in a context, holding back from capitulation to its terms, because of specific 
hopes for how these terms might be altered, or out of an indeterminate hope without an end. 
 
Yet the tensions that sustain reserve, as well as permitting some compromised freedom, can also 
be dangerous, and indeterminate hope actually function in practice as a devastating despair with 
the world available to us. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard describes ‘reserve’ evocatively as 
‘inwardness with a jammed lock’ (1983, p. 73). He urges that reserve ‘must be the particular 
object of attention’ because of its dual position, representing either or both liberation and loss in 
the encounter between subject and world. And in Stages on Life’s Way (1988), Kierkegaard also 
makes the subtle point, with which Berlant appears to agree, that whilst unbearable experiences 
may perhaps form a psychological impetus for reserve, this does not necessarily account for or 
explain the possible functions of reserve in the present. Nor will these functions necessarily be 
conscious or apparent to the subjects themselves. In Kierkegaard’s estimate, the significance of 
reserve lies in the liberating potential it offers from the limits of the encountered world. 
However, it can also cut the subject off from the sustenance that can only be gained through this 
encounter; reserve therefore is a trap, and best conceptualized as a kind of depression, if it 
becomes too permanent or intensively applied. As such, reserve risks unintelligibility with 
others, and this can be dangerous as it is in communication with others that we are recognized 
Sanity, Madness and the Family: A retrospective, Journal of Psychosocial Studies, Special Issue, 
Volume 11, Issue 1, April 2018 
 
 
 85 
and sustained – where this communication is able to access some relation with authenticity as a 
perpetual and precarious process. Laing concurs with Kierkegaard on this point in The Divided 
Self (1960).  
 
Laing and Esterson also raise a second danger attached to the kind of split in being-in-the-world 
that reserve or flat affect represent. The space carved out through this strategy can be deployed 
as some degree of freedom – but it can also and at the same time support the elaboration of an 
inner world based on persecutory phantasy reserved from reality-testing. An individual’s 
psychosocial organisation will then miss the safety-valve that reality-testing provides. For Laing 
and Esterson, into the space made for freedom can come an invasion of phantasy which will be 
full of anger and fear especially where communication with the environment as anchor has been 
cut off. Laing and Esterson (1970, p. 216) identify this additional danger attached to operations 
performed on the feelings which organize the self-world boundary:  
 
secondary consequences may ensue which were not intended. For instance, if you shut 
people off, and put things out of your mind, you may come to a stop, feel empty, and a 
necessarily fearful form of the inrush or implosion of reality in a persecuting form.  
 
Laing and Esterson discuss this inrush as necessary in the context of flat affect. But the space 
opened up by reserve is not necessarily one which leads to persecutory phantasy, with freedom 
opening at the price of a painful and fearful inner world. This outcome is primarily the 
consequence of flat affect occurring as a response to something felt to be unbearable in the 
experienced environment, which inhibits communication. Where, by contrast, reserve operates as 
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part of the composition of communication, it can form beautiful, helpful constellations – such as 
sensitive tact, trust between friends, a hanging silence to allow emergence and realization, 
confident modesty, patience for the future. The point is shown most vividly, perhaps, by the 
technical and integral role given to reserve by Freud at the very foundation of psychoanalysis. To 
create the psychoanalytic encounter, the patient must ‘give himself up to the thoughts that occur 
to him spontaneously and to say without any critical reserve whatever comes into his head’, 
whilst at the same time the analyst must enact a certain ‘reserve’ in order to become the smooth, 
opaque surface for the projections which spur the transference (Freud, 2001, p. 107; 1974, p. 
479). Such reserve, as with all reserve, can help engage contact which is intense, full, clear and 
clean. 
 
The reserve of the analyst and the lack of reserve of the patient bring about a specific social-
psychological configuration, which intensifies processes that would in any case happen to some 
degree within everyday life. The configuration renews the interface between the patient and her 
possibilities for living and sources of libido, which had been renounced under some historical 
bargain between ego and world, and which had therefore been transformed into phantasy: 
 
In the activity of phantasy human beings continue to enjoy the freedom from external 
compulsion which they have long since renounced in reality… The creation of the 
mental realm of phantasy finds a perfect parallel in the establishment of 
‘reservations’ or ‘nature reserves’ in places where the requirements of agriculture, 
communications and industry threaten to bring about changes in the original face of 
the earth which will quickly make it unrecognizable. A nature reserve preserves its 
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original state which everywhere else has to our regret been sacrificed to necessity. 
(Freud, 2001, p. 372) 
 
Freud perceived the human mind as having such spaces of ‘reservation’. Where the ego is unable 
to give up its interpersonal reserve as a tight hold on a determinate standing reserve of possible 
investments and ways of living, the intrapersonal reserve constituted by the id remains 
inaccessible except as phantasy or enacted symptom. However, in relaxing the ego’s critical 
reserve within the clinical encounter and permitting uncontrolled forms of engagement and 
speech to occur, the patients open themselves to a repopulation of their forms of life from the 
options and energies that were, at some point in the past, quashed or sacrificed to the reality 
principle (Green, 2002). The reserve of the therapist opens up some space for renegotiating the 
terms of personal freedom, finding some new compromise with available reality.  
 
Of course, history has shown the limitations to Freud’s technical insertion of a therapeutic space 
as a gearbox to mediate social requirements with subjective desire, and even its transmutation 
into a mechanism for the cultural compulsion to express emotion. In the realities of Laing and 
Esterton’s psychiatry users, patients maintain a reserve that is well-advised given not only 
oppressive family interactions, but also that therapists’ reserve is often compromised by their 
place in disciplinary institutions that systematically misrecognize their patients. But it is not at all 
fruitful to cast therapeutic practice within the compliance / resistance binary, with the therapist 
either disciplining or emancipating some inner, natural state for the subject. Just as nature 
reserves are now widely recognised to be feats of social and ecological engineering, the kinds of 
reserve performed or relaxed in therapy should be approached as a social and practical 
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achievement. This acknowledges their embeddedness in power games and their dangers, along 
with their potential for engendering creative phantasy and authentic insight into ourselves, 
permitting some compromised, valuable freedom.  
 
Such an approach suggests a way of grasping the paradox that, when we access great works of 
literature or social science, like Laing and Esterson’s Sanity, Madness and the Family, they 
increase their reserve of insight to the very extent to which we draw from it. Reserve is not 
simply something we can use to hold back from the world, but something that can occur, or be 
cultivated to occur, within the world that we encounter, enlivening or shifting the organization of 
our self-world boundary. An illustration is Berlant, who encounters flat affect, and is brought to 
ask about her and our insertion into regimes of compulsory emotions, and the psychosocial price 
of these. Flat affect shows how a compromised, valuable freedom can be carved out from even 
profoundly depletory environments. Likewise reserve, a less extreme and emergency form of flat 
affect which is more differentiated and responsive to changing environments, represents a subtle 
strategy through which power and subjectivity may be negotiated. The potential strategic 
significance of flat affect and reserve would be overlooked by a lens focused on resistance and 
compliance. As the clinical setting illustrates, where it is not deployed in an undifferentiated way 
as a barrier against the world, reserve thoughtfully used can engender other ways of seeking and 
perhaps finding a sufficiently-stable, richly-felt life.  
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